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Abstract: 
Reuter, Roth, Holve, & Hennig (2006) described what they called the first candidate gene for creativity. 
This study replicated and extended their work for a more careful analysis of five candidate genes: 
Dopamine Transporter (DAT), Catechol-O-Methyltransferase (COMT), Dopamine Receptor D4 (DRD4), 
D2 Dopamine Receptor (DRD2), and Tryptophane Hydroxylase (TPH1). Participants were 147 college 
students who received a battery of tests of creative potential. Multivariate analyses of variance indicated 
that ideational fluency scores were significantly associated with several genes (DAT, COMT, DRD4, and 
TPH1). This was apparent in both verbal and figural fluency ideation scores, before and after controlling 
general intelligence. Yet fluency, alone, is not an adequate measure of creativity, and the index that is by 
far the most important part of creativity (i.e., originality) had a negligible relationship with the genes 
under investigation. Hence, in contrast to earlier research, the conclusion offered here is that there is a 
clear genetic basis for ideational fluency, but that fluency, alone, is not sufficient to predict or guarantee 
creative performance. Hence, at present, the genetic basis of creativity remains uncertain. 
 
Creativity will only be well understood when its genetic basis is identified. Fortunately, great headway in 
this direction is being made, largely as a result of advanced technologies. For years the genetic basis of 
creativity could only be inferred from patterns of correlations among monozygotic versus dizygotic twins 
(Barron, 1972; Reznikoff, Domino, Bridges, & Honeyman, 1973; Runco, in press-b), or from differences 
in the correlations between children and their biological or foster parents. Now genes themselves can be 
examined. A much more accurate picture of the biological bases of creativity is emerging. 
Reuter et al. (2006) described what they called the first candidate gene for creativity. They pointed to 
DRD2 because of its association with various measures designed to estimate creative potential. Clearly, 
these findings were merely a first step. In fact, that step may have been slightly askew; the earlier results 
were limited in several ways. First, Reuter et al. used an uncommon measure of creativity, making it 
somewhat difficult to interpret the meaning of their findings. Their measure was reliable (.85) but the 
description of it implies a connection with mathematical talent and convergent thinking. The latter is 
required whenever solutions are found by generating conventional or single correct ideas, and that is in 
direct contrast to divergent thinking, which is assessed with open-ended problems and seems to play a 
role in many creative performances (Guilford, 1968; Runco, 1991). Reuter et al. did describe their work 
as a pilot study. 
One of the six subtests used by Reuter et al. (2006) was described as if it would provide similar results to 
the very commonly used Alternative Uses test of divergent thinking (DT; Guilford, 1968; Runco, 1991; 
Torrance, 1995) but the scores from this subtest were merely added into a composite, along with the other 
five subtests used by Reuter et al., and those other five subtests have dubious connection to creativity. 
They are much too convergent and preclude the original thinking that is vital for true creativity (Cropley 
& Cropley, 2009; Runco, 1988). It is unfortunate that Reuter et al. added all six of their subtest scores into 
one composite. This served to confound convergent and divergent thinking and blur any specific 
relationship with creative potential. 
The present investigation used well-recognized tests of creative potential and scored them for originality 
(to allow a clear interpretation about creativity) as well as fluency (to replicate the earlier findings). A 
more homogeneous measure of creative potential was used, thereby minimizing the possibility of any 
possible confound with general intelligence or mathematical talent. Flexibility scores, also commonly 
used in studies of creative potential, were calculated from the divergent thinking tests, in addition to 
originality and flexibility. This is all common practice when estimating the potential for creative problem 
solving (Guilford, 1968; Torrance, 1995). 
The calculation of separate fluency, originality, and flexibility scores is of critical importance. Fluency 
only represents productivity. It can be quite meaningful, but it is not nearly as closely tied to creativity as 
is originality. Indeed, originality is the key to creativity. All creative things must be original. They must 
also be fitting somehow, aesthetically or functionally, but they must be original or they are not creative. 
This is one reason why fluency is sometimes unrelated to creativity. A person can be extremely fluent but 
only generate common and unoriginal (or useless) ideas and solutions. Originality can be defined in terms 
of the uniqueness or unusualness of ideas (Torrance, 1995). Flexibility represents the variety of ideas 
given and is also often associated with creative problem solving (Guilford, 1968; Runco, 1991). 
In addition to employing common procedures for the assessment of creative potential, this research also 
extended earlier efforts by expanding the number of genes from 3 to 5: Dopamine Transporter (DAT), 
Catechol-O-Methyltransferase (COMT), Dopamine Receptor D4 (DRD4), D2 Dopamine Receptor 
(DRD2), and Tryptophane Hydroxylase (TPH1). The methods used to isolate each are described in the 
following. These were chosen primarily because of Reuter et al.'s (2002) findings about dopamine, as 
well as explicit hypotheses from Eysenck (1997) about the bases of creativity. 
 
Method 
Participants and Procedure 
The sample consisted of 147 students from a Midwestern university (98 women and 49 men). All 
participants were White (self-reported). The mean age was 21.6 (SD = 3.8). 
Participants were recruited through announcements in classrooms and received extra credit for 
participation. Participants signed up for group sessions. When participants arrived in the lab, they first 
completed the paper-and-pencil measures. Buccal (cheek) cells for DNA analysis were then taken. The 
buccal cells were suspended in a 0.9% saline solution. They were sent to UCLA where, after 
centrifugation, DNA was isolated from the deposited cells using standard procedures. Polymorphisms of 
the 5 genes were determined using method described in earlier research. These are indicated by the 
citations for each polymorphism:  
• DAT1 (Vanderbergh et al., 1992), 
• COMT (Hoda et al., 1966), 
• DRD4 (Lichter et al., 1993), 
• DRD2 (Grandy, Zhang, & Civelli, 1993), and 
• TPH1 (Reuter et al., 2006). 
After complete description of the study to the subjects, written informed consent was obtained. 
The genes under investigation were analyzed as dichotomous variables, as in previous investigations on 
these same genes. Thus for the DRD2 it was A1+ vs. A1-; for DAT it was 9R+ vs. 9R-; for COMT it was 
V+ vs. V-; for DRD4 it was 7R+ vs. 7R-; for TPH1 it was A+ vs. A-. The risk alleles were as follows: for 
the DRD2 it was the A1+ allele; for DAT it was the 9R+ allele; for COMT it was the V+ allele; for DRD4 
it was the 7R+ allele; and for TPNH1 it was the A+ allele. (See Table 1.) The table is formatted to allow 
easy comparisons with the earlier genetic studies, cited earlier.  
  
 
 
 
Measures 
DT 
Creative potential was measured using DT tests. Two different types of DT tests were used. Verbal DT was 
evaluated using three items. Participants were asked to “List as many things as you can that are square,” “List 
as many things as you can that move on wheels,” and “List as many things as you can that make noise.” A 
second set of three DT items were figural. The figural DT items showed participants a line drawing and asked 
participants to name all the things it can be. All DT items have demonstrated good reliability in various 
studies (e.g., Runco, 1991; Wallach & Kogan, 1965). The responses for each DT item, verbal and figural, 
were scored in several ways. First, the number of different ideas listed was counted as used a measure of 
fluency. The originality of each idea was evaluated using the number of individuals who listed the idea 
relative to the total sample. Only ideas that were given by less the 5% of the sample were scored as original. 
Finally, flexibility was defined as the ability to break mental set. In the context of DT tests, flexibility was 
indicated by ideas that were not strongly related to one another and therefore suggest different conceptual 
categories. In order to evaluate flexibility, items were first assigned into broader categories, and the number of 
different categories used was the flexibility score. 
Realistic creative problem solving 
Creative problem solving was evaluated by providing participants with an open-ended, real-life problem 
situation (Reiter-Palmon, Illies, Kobe, Buboltz, & Nimps, 2009). Participants were then asked to provide a 
solution to this problem. Solutions were then rated by trained raters, using the consensual assessment 
technique (Amabile, 1990) for quality, originality, and complexity. Quality was defined as the degree to 
which the solution is useful, appropriate, and actually solves multiple facets of the problem. Originality was 
defined as the degree to which the solution is novel, unique, and not structured by the problem. Complexity 
was defined as the number of different ideas or components expressed in the solutions. Interrater reliability 
was .79 for originality, .81 for quality, and .87 for complexity. 
Wonderlic intelligence test 
General mental ability was measured using the Wonderlic, a paper-and-pencil, 12-minute timed test 
(Wonderlic, 1992). It includes 50 items measuring both verbal and quantitative ability. The Wonderlic 
correlates very highly with the WAIS-R (r = .92), and test–retest reliabilities range from .82 to .94. 
Analyses 
All five genes were in Hardy-Weinberg Equilibrium and in linkage equilibrium. The genes under 
investigation were analyzed as dichotomous variables as in a previous study (Conner, Hellemann, Ritchie, & 
Noble, 2009). For the COMT, the presence of the Val homozygote (Val/Val) and Val heterozygote (Val/Met) 
or Val+ was considered a genetic risk marker for hypodopaminergic functioning compared to the Met 
homozygote (Met/Met) or Val-. For the DRD2, the presence of the A1 homozytote (A1/A1) and A1 
heterozygote (A1/A2) or A1+ was considered a genetic risk marker for hypodopaminergic functioning 
compared to the A2 homozygote (A2A2) or A1−. For the Dopamine Transporter, the presence of the 9 R 
homozygote (9R/9R) and 9R heterozygote (9R/Non9R) or 9R+ was considered a genetic risk marker for 
hypodopaminergic functioning compared to the Non9R homozygote (Non9R/Non9 R) or 9R-. For the DRD4, 
the presence of the 7R homozygote (7R/7R) and 7R heterozygote (7R/Non7R) or 7R+ was considered a 
genetic risk marker for hypodopaminergic functioning compared to the Non7R homozygote (Non7R/Non7R) 
or 7R−. 
 
Results 
A MANOVA was conducted using DAT, COMT, DRD4, DRD2, and TPH1 as the predictors and the three 
fluency scores from the verbal DT tasks as the criteria. Each of the genes was coded dichotomously (0 = at 
risk, 1 = nonrisk). Results indicated that the two DAT groups and the DRD4 groups differed significantly; 
F(3, 53) = 18.15, p < .001; (adjusted Xi squared) = .488 and F(3, 53) = 14.70, p < .001, and 
 = .432, respectively. COMT showed these same group differences; Fs(3, 54) = 3.61, p = .019; 
 = .010. DRD2 approached statistical significance; F(3, 53) = 2.62, p = .060;  = .083. The effect 
sizes given take into account Serlin's (1982) observation that sample statistics may overestimate the strength 
of relationship between dependent and independent variable, depending on the number of levels of a grouping 
variable, the number of dependent variables, and the sample size. With that in mind, the effect size values 
(chi-squared) were adjusted. 
A second MANOVA used the fluency scores from the figural divergent thinking tests as criteria. Here, there 
were significant group differences for COMT, TPH1, and DRD4; F(1, 53) = 4.53, p = .007,  = .164; F(1, 
53) = 4.71, p = .006,  = .171; and F(1, 53) = 3.16, p = .032,  = .107, respectively. DAT showed a 
marginal difference between the groups; F(1, 53) = 2.2, p = .098,  = .063. 
 
Originality and Flexibility 
The next analyses used the originality scores as the criteria. Ideas generated by less than 5% of the sample 
were identified, with originality then defined as the number of these unusual ideas produced by any one 
participant. This method is very frequently used in studies of creativity (for a review see Runco, 1991; Runco, 
in press). Results for the verbal divergent thinking tests uncovered significant group differences were 
observed for DAT, DRD4, and DRD2; F(1, 53) = 12.72, p < .001,  = .394; F(1,53) = 9.10, p < .001, 
 = .310; and F(1, 53) = 3.70, p = .017,  = .130 respectively. In addition, marginally significant 
results were obtained for COMT; F(1, 53) = 2.47, p = .072,  = .076. 
Results from MANOVAs that used originality from the figural divergent thinking test scores showed 
significant results for DAT and DRD4; F(1, 53) = 3.91, p = .014,  = .139; and F(1, 53) = 3.10, p = .034 
 = .104, respectively. 
Because originality scores can be contaminated by fluency (Hocevar, 1980; Runco & Albert, 1985), a second 
originality index was calculated and used in additional analyses. It represented the ratio of original ideas to 
total ideas (fluency). This kind of ratio has also been used successfully in the past (Runco, 1991) and has the 
advantage of indicating relationships with originality when fluency has been controlled. 
There were no significant effects in the MANOVAs when this index of originality was used—none for the 
verbal scores, none for the figural scores. This is an extremely important finding. This will be explored in the 
Discussion section. 
MANOVAs using the flexibility score (the number of different conceptual categories used in a person's set of 
ideas) from the divergent thinking tests as the criteria showed significant results only for DAT; F(3, 
56) = 4.10, p = .011,  = .140. 
 
Controlling Intelligence and ANOVA of Realistic Problems 
Importantly, MANOVAs were also conducted using intelligence (the Wonderlic) test scores as a covariate. 
Results confirmed the relationships reported above. The same creativity criteria were related to the same 
genes. Intelligence was only a significant covariate in two cases (flexibility from the figural divergent 
thinking tests and quality scores from the realistic problems), but even there, the relationships between 
creativity test scores and genes were unchanged. (Flexibility actually showed a stronger relationship with 
DRD4 after controlling intelligence, but was still only p = .074.) Very clearly, intelligence did not contribute 
to the relationships found between creativity test scores and the genes examined in this research. 
Scores from the realistic, open-ended problem were then analyzed. As only one problem was used, an 
ANOVA was used to determine the effects of genes on solution quality, originality, and complexity. No 
significant effects were found. 
 
Discussion 
These results support earlier findings from Reuter et al. (2006) that fluency is related to certain genes. This 
replication is useful because a different set of tasks was used in this research. These tasks have a much clearer 
connection to creativity than the tasks in the earlier research. Note also that this research found connections 
between fluency and several dopamine genes rather than just DRD2. 
It is quite important that the relationships with fluency were not biased by general intelligence. In other 
words, the associations uncovered here are not merely the result of a genetic basis of general ability. In fact, 
as noted, the relationship between divergent thinking and the genes was sharper (and remained significant) 
when intelligence test scores were statistically controlled. 
At least as important is that the genes investigated were not related to originality or flexibility from the 
various DT tasks, nor with scores on the realistic tests of creative problem solving. Given that (a) fluency is 
not, by itself, indicative of creativity; and (b) the measures most directly related to actual creative potential 
(i.e., originality indices) were not associated with genetic group differences, the obvious conclusion is that 
fluency has a genetic basis, where as originality, and therefore creativity, does not. At least originality and 
creativity are not related to the genes examined in this research, and these genes were, of course, chosen 
because there was a theoretical justification for them. Other genes may be more strongly related to originality 
and creativity than those examined here. That can be determined by future research. Still, the genes 
investigated here were chosen in part because theories have described creativity as something that might 
depend on certain processes and, therefore, certain genes (Eysenck, 1997). 
The key to interpreting these findings is remembering that originality is vital for true creativity, but fluency is 
not. All definitions of creativity include originality and label it a prerequisite, or at least note that it is 
necessary but not sufficient for creativity (Cropley & Cropley, 2009; Runco, 1988, 2006). Fluency is not 
sufficient because original things are sometimes useless, and fluent individuals are sometimes unoriginal. 
High fluency has been found to characterize some samples that are low in actual creativity. Psychotics, for 
example, may be highly fluent, even though they are not truly creative (Eysenck, 1997). Still, it is interesting 
that ideational fluency may have a genetic basis. 
Perhaps what is being expressed in fluency is merely a kind of cognitive energy that leads to a large number 
of ideas being produced. For some individuals, these can be elaborated, evaluated, filtered, and adapted such 
that some ideas become original and creativity is eventually expressed. For other people, the ideas are 
worthless or never developed, and creativity is not expressed. In this light, the present research is consistent 
with the idea that there is a significant difference between creative potential and actual creative performance. 
Certainly, a larger sample should be employed in future research, but these results suggest that ideational 
fluency, alone, has a genetic basis. Given the likely interplay between nature and nurture in the fulfillment 
and expression of creative potentials (Runco, in press-a), these findings should be interpreted along with 
previous studies of the impact of experience on creativity (e.g., Runco & Acars, in press; Runco & Albert, 
2005). 
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